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NOTE 
 
DATA LOCALIZATION:   
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
OF PRIVACY LITIGATION 
H JACQUELINE BREHMER* 
This Note addresses a key unintended consequence of recent data privacy 
litigation before the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Two cases—Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems and United 
States v. Microsoft Corp.—contravene the principles upon which the internet 
was founded by removing legal and scalable mechanisms for cross-border data 
transfers.  While these cases do not directly create data localization regimes, they 
highlight the irreconcilably different approaches to data privacy held by the 
United States and the European Union and eliminate valid options for transfer 
such that localization is the only remaining scalable solution.  Data localization 
is not solely expensive for companies; it also puts user privacy and global 
enterprise security at risk by creating greater government access to data, 
expanding the attack surface for cybersecurity threats, and minimizing the 
efficacy of data security tools.  Thus, while these cases may increase user trust 
and privacy in the short-term, they are likely to lead to data localization and 
have long-term effects on internet use and access worldwide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When litigation is used to create policy, it can have unintended 
consequences.1  This is especially true in the data security and privacy 
sectors, where the law and technology are developing at different rates.  
Thus, when lawyers and judges do not fully consider the legal and 
                                               
 1. See Mary Mitchell & Dana A. Remus, Interstitial Exclusivities After Association for 
Molecular Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 39 (2014) (commenting 
that “[i]mpact litigation can be an effective means of placing pressure on the other 
branches of government . . . , but courts are not as effective as the other branches of 
government at crafting and implementing long-term solutions that adequately account 
for costs and second order consequences”). 
2018] DATA LOCALIZATION 929 
 
practical repercussions of technology, they run the risk of 
undermining the successful advocates’ original position.  Nothing 
illustrates this risk more than the recent data privacy cases in the 
United States and European Union.  Advocates in these cases brought 
their claims to defend privacy rights; however, their success before the 
European Court of Justice (CJEU)2  and the Second Circuit will 
paradoxically have the opposite effect by negatively impacting global 
user privacy and enterprise cybersecurity.3 
Two cases—Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (Schrems II)4 before 
the CJEU and United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Ireland)5  before 
the U.S. Supreme Court—along with pending challenges to the EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield, are forcing this issue.  In the former case, the 
plaintiff, Mr. Schrems, is challenging the ability of U.S. companies to 
transfer EU user data from the European Union to the United States 
using Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), which are EU-issued 
contractual clauses that seek to establish safeguards for cross-border 
data transfers.6  Mr. Schrems claims that such mechanisms fail to 
provide adequate safeguards for transfer.7  Simultaneously, in Microsoft 
Ireland, Microsoft is arguing that the application of U.S. law to law 
enforcement’s ability to compel user data stored abroad by American 
companies is an inappropriate extraterritorial extension of law 
                                               
 2. This Note uses the phrase “CJEU data privacy cases” to collectively refer to Data 
Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (“Schrems I”) and Data Protection Commissioner v. Schrems 
(“Schrems II”).  Data Prot. Comm’r v. Schrems (Schrems II) [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) 
(Ir.); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), 2014 E.C.R. 6. 
 3. See In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored 
at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., Case No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 
3445634, at *27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (commenting that “the Microsoft decision may 
incentivize states to pass data localization laws to restrict their nationals from locating 
customer data abroad”); Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 677, 680 (2015) (“Data localization increases the ability of governments to surveil 
and even oppress their own populations . . . .  By creating national barriers to data, 
data localization measures break up the World Wide Web, which was designed to share 
information across the globe.”). 
 4. [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 5. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), petition for 
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 6. Complaint against Facebook Ireland Ltd from Maximilian Schrems, to Data 
Prot. Comm’r at 10 (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/292096534/ 
Complaint-against-Facebook-Ireland-Ltd. 
 7. Id. 
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enforcement powers.8  Though the former argument restrains 
commercial transfers of user data and the latter limits law enforcement 
access to data, they both ultimately impede cross-border data transfers 
such that data localization is the sole scalable legal and business 
solution available to U.S. companies. 
While these cases do not directly cause the implementation of data 
localization laws or regulations, they do highlight the irreconcilable 
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to data privacy.  
Unfortunately, these differences ultimately boil down to key aspects of the 
U.S. legal system, such as Article III standing.9  Thus, if the CJEU and the 
U.S. Supreme Court find for the original plaintiffs, the United States will 
be forced to either walk back foundational aspects of the U.S. legal system 
or put U.S. corporations in a position where they must localize data.10 
Data localization is not new, and governments normally implement 
localization through restrictive laws and regulations that bar the 
movement of data in and out of a country.11  Such laws are generally 
criticized for being expensive for corporations and protectionist.12  
Unfortunately, the costs are not only financial.13  Localization will also 
negatively impact user privacy and enterprise security worldwide by 
creating greater government access to user data,14 minimizing the 
efficacy of corporate privacy and security controls, and expanding the 
                                               
 8. Brief for Appellant at 1–2, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (No. 14-2985-cv), 2014 WL 7004807, at *1–2. 
 9. See Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck ¶¶ 80–95, Schrems II [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 10. This Note recognizes that there are other alternatives for data transfers to the 
United States besides Privacy Shield and SCCs; however, these bases, such as consent, 
are highly fact-specific, specialized, and may be subject to disclosure requirements.  
Additionally, the legal diversity and complexity of these options likely make them out 
of reach for many companies. 
 11. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
AND INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOWS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 13 
(2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2016d1_en.pdf. 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. See infra Sections V.B–C. 
 14. This Note uses “user data” to describe a wide range of data that is collected 
and processed by commercial entities and law enforcement.  This includes: (1) non-
content information, such as personal identifying information or subscriber 
information (e.g., username, registration IP address, or date of birth); 
(2) transactional information, such IP address logs or billing records; and (3) content 
information, such as production of emails or a wiretaps.  H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 121–24 (2009) https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
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corporate network.15  The CJEU’s data privacy and Microsoft Ireland 
cases facilitate localization by highlighting the unamenable differences 
between EU and U.S. approaches to privacy and by assigning a 
territorial identity to data.  Thus, while these cases may provide an 
appearance of greater protection, they place user privacy and security 
at greater risk of exposure to good and bad actors alike. 
This Note explores data localization as a key unintended 
consequence of the CJEU’s data privacy cases and the Second Circuit’s 
Microsoft Ireland case.  It argues that these cases will undermine user 
privacy and global enterprise security by restricting the movement of 
data across borders and forcing corporations to localize by invalidating 
key data transfer mechanisms.  Part I first outlines the concept of data 
localization and then details EU and U.S. data privacy laws and the 
various mechanisms for transfer from the European Union to the 
United States.  This Part also discusses the EU and U.S. perspectives on 
standing and notes that this irreconcilable difference could 
undermine cross-border data transfers between the European Union 
and United States.  Part II discusses the legal mechanisms used for data 
transfers by commercial entities and law enforcement.  Part III analyzes 
two pending cases—Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland—and how these 
cases affect the validity of data transfer mechanisms. 
Part IV addresses how these cases erect barriers to the movement of 
data and remove key mechanisms for data transfer.  This Part also 
discusses how localization undermines user privacy and security by 
providing governments with greater access to user data and limiting the 
efficacy of data security tools.  Finally, Part V concludes by asking the CJEU 
and U.S. Supreme Court to rule in favor of greater security and privacy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
If the courts in Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland hold for the plaintiffs, 
data localization will be a practical rather than legal consequence.  To 
reach this conclusion, it is necessary to understand how the United 
States and the European Union conceptualize and implement data 
privacy protections, including an analysis of key U.S. surveillance 
                                               
 15. See infra Sections V.B–C (explaining that localization benefits foreign 
governments at the cost of user privacy by limiting the ability of companies to shift data 
across national borders when the political climate changes); see also Stephen 
Northcutt, Security Laboratory:  Defense in Depth Series, SANS TECH. INSTIT. (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2018) https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-laboratory/article/did-
attack-surface (defining attack surface as “our exposure, the reachable and exploitable 
vulnerabilities that we have”). 
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programs and redress mechanisms available when a privacy violation 
has occurred.  Ultimately, the validity of EU-U.S. cross-border data 
transfers turns on whether the transfers from the European Union are 
conducted pursuant to a privacy regime commensurate with, but not 
necessarily identical to, those provided in the European Union.  The U.S. 
system is unlikely to meet the EU standard because the United States and 
European Union have such fundamentally different approaches to 
privacy law that it is unlikely the European Union would deem the U.S. 
system adequate.  Consequently, because transfers are no longer an 
option, localizing data will become the norm, rather than the exception. 
A. Data Localization 
Generally, countries maintain three primary justifications for 
implementing data localization regulations.  First, some countries view 
localization as critical to protecting their respective citizens from U.S. 
surveillance.16  Second, others justify localization because it benefits 
their domestic law enforcement by increasing the accessibility of user 
data through local legal processes.17  Third, data localization also has a 
protectionist motive, and countries have used it as means to bolster 
domestic markets.18 
Despite these purported benefits, data localization has several 
negative consequences.  One particularly worrisome consequence is 
the direct financial burden placed on companies and consumers.19  In 
2013, data localization was predicted to cost cloud computing services 
                                               
 16. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 713–14 (explaining that the propensity to pass 
data localization laws may have stemmed from the 2013 leak of classified U.S. surveillance 
documents by National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden). 
 17. See Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders:  The Evolving 
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 478 (2016) (explaining 
that “[s]uch laws also facilitate domestic surveillance”); infra Section II.B (discussing 
the structure and issues with the current mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) process). 
 18. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 714 (noting that data localization hinders 
global markets in favor of local markets by barring foreign services access across 
borders and inviting reciprocal treatment in return). 
 19. Id. at 699, 723–24.  This cost is derived from many expenses including, but not 
limited to, building data centers, employing new teams, and complying with local 
regulations.  Id.  In response to this, some companies have begun pre-emptively 
expanding their global footprint.  See, e.g., Tony Kontzer, IBM Spends $1.2 Billion on 
New Cloud Data Centers, NETWORK COMPUTING (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:48 PM) (describing 
IBM’s investment in data centers world-wide to satisfy growing localization 
requirements); Nick Wingfield & Mark Scott, Microsoft Suggests Wider Options for Foreign 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014, 5:00 PM) (commenting on Microsoft’s potential plans 
for expansion in response to new data localization laws). 
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between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016.20  The majority of this 
high cost stems from the development and staffing of necessary 
technical infrastructure essential for compliance with data localization 
requirements, which can amount to upwards of $60.9 million.21 
Further, a long-term financial impact study of data localization in 
seven major countries concluded that recently proposed or 
implemented data localization legislation substantially impacted the 
gross domestic products of all seven countries studied, finding welfare 
losses of $63 billion in China and $193 billion in the European 
Union.22  The report also suggested that while localization will increase 
costs for U.S. companies, consumers worldwide will actually pay the 
price as companies shift the cost of localization onto consumers.23  
Despite the known financial costs of data localization, several countries 
have still legislated and implemented these regimes.  Though the 
United States and European Union have generally permitted the free 
and open flow of information, the trend towards data localization 
reflects each nation’s approach to data privacy. 
B. EU and U.S. Approaches to Data Privacy 
The United States’ and European Union’s different perspectives on 
privacy turn on the recognition of privacy either as an aspect of 
individual dignity or as a function of individual liberty.24  In Europe, 
                                               
 20. See DANIEL CASTRO, HOW MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING 
INDUSTRY? 1 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf (noting 
this figure is limited to the cost of cloud computing service providers). 
 21. See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Breaking the Web:  Data Localization v. the 
Global Internet 36–37 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 378), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2407858 (breaking down the construction and maintenance 
costs of foreign data centers); Loretta Chao & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Legislators Bear Down 
on Internet Bill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazil-
legislators-bear-down-on-internet-bill-1384384450 (explaining that data localization 
“could cost U.S. companies tens of billions of dollars”). 
 22. See Matthias Bauer et al., THE COSTS OF DATA LOCALISATION:  FRIENDLY FIRE ON 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 2 (2014) (arguing that unilateral data restrictions create larger 
economic losses). 
 23. Id.; see also Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
729, 753 (2016) (clarifying that internet companies have to increase user fees or 
reduce services because of the high costs brought about by localization requirements). 
 24. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a 
form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity.  The core continental privacy 
rights are rights to one’s image, name, and reputation . . . .  By contrast, America . . . is much 
more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the state.  At its 
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privacy is considered a part of the individual’s dignity, and citizens have 
the “right to be shielded against unwanted public exposure.”25  As such, 
the right to privacy, and more specifically the right to privacy in 
communications, is enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.26  Conversely, the U.S. approach to privacy derives from the 
concept of liberty and hinges on the idea that citizens should be free 
from state intrusion.27  Consequently, U.S. privacy protections were 
originally derived from the Fourth Amendment but have developed in 
U.S. jurisprudence within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth Amendments. 
These theoretical differences are reflected in substantive 
distinctions in EU and U.S. data privacy laws and regulations.28  As 
described below, the European Union uses a comprehensive approach 
with broad, overarching data protection laws that expands across 
various sectors, applies extraterritorially, and protects individuals 
located in the European Union regardless of citizenship.29  Unlike the 
European Union, the United States employs a sectoral approach, 
consisting of different laws and regulations for each commercial 
sector.30  This seemingly inconsequential distinction is at the basis of 
the data privacy disputes before the CJEU. 
1. EU data privacy 
The EU Data Protection Directive (Directive) is the foundation of 
the European data privacy regulation.31  Adopted in 1995, the Directive 
                                               
conceptual core, the American right to privacy still takes much the form that it took in 
the eighteenth century:  It is the right to freedom from intrusions by the state, 
especially in one’s own home.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 1153; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. 
 27. See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1161. 
 28. Id. 
 29. EU General Data Protection Regulation, EPIC (last visited Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://epic.org/international/eu_general_data_protection_reg.html (describing 
the multiple key points of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that 
collectively make it a comprehensive data regulation regime). 
 30. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. 
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 (1995) (addressing the American anti-
comprehensive model sentiment and analyzing the U.S. privacy law by sector). 
 31. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter 
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comprehensively details the data rights of EU citizens, outlines the 
obligations of governments and corporations with respect to those 
rights, and requires that all data transfers maintain adequate 
safeguards to protect the personal information of EU individuals.32  
The Directive is being replaced in May 2018 by the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).33  In terms of data transfer provisions, 
the GDPR expands and clarifies the mechanisms and requirements for 
data transfer from the European Union to third-party countries.34  
However, the change in laws from the Directive to the GDPR is unlikely 
to have any impact on the admissibility of the claims in Schrems II and 
Microsoft Ireland because the underlying issues in question are so 
fundamental to rights guaranteed under the EU Charter. 
The principles for cross-border data transfers are laid out in Articles 
25 and 26 of the Directive.35  Article 25 requires that transfers of 
personal data from the European Union to a third-party country 
ensure an adequate level of protection.36  This determination depends 
on the country’s domestic laws, the nature of the data transferred, and 
                                               
Directive]; Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy:  The 
New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 617–18 (2013). 
 32. See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257, U.S.-
EU DATA PRIVACY:  FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 2 (2016), https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R44257.pdf. 
 33. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L. 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].  The 
GDPR is a comprehensive data privacy regime that implements several new and 
aggressive requirements for the handling of EU resident data.  Detlev Gabel & Tim 
Hickman, Cross-Border Data Transfers—Unlocking the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, in UNLOCKING THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION:  A 
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE EU’S NEW DATA PROTECTION LAW (2017), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-13-cross-border-data-
transfers-unlocking-eu-general-data-protection.  The more notable changes from the 
Directive to the GDPR include:  increased fines for non-compliance of up to 4% of 
global turnover, express territorial application, and the right to be forgotten.  Id.  With 
some exceptions, the provisions on transfer remain largely the same.  Id.  The 
provisions governing cross-border data transfers are reflected in Articles 44 through 
50, which primarily clarifies the different methodologies of transfer.  Id. 
 34. See Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy:  The 
New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 640–41 (2013). 
 35. See Directive, supra note 31, art. 25–26.  Under the GDPR, data transfer 
provisions are located in articles 44 through 50.  GDPR, arts. 44–50. 
 36. Id. art. 25. 
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the purpose of the transfer.37  Even if a third-party country’s domestic 
laws do not ensure sufficient safeguards, a country can still meet the 
requisite standard based upon international commitments negotiated 
between the third-party country and the European Commission.38  
Notably, the Directive does not require identical laws but instead 
requires that the third-party country employ domestic laws or maintain 
international obligations that create protections “essentially 
equivalent” to those provided to EU citizens.39  The Directive 
empowers the European Commission to render an adequacy decision40 
determining whether the domestic law of the third-party state “ensures 
an adequate level of protection . . . for the protection of private lives 
and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.”41 
If Article 25 is not met, the Directive prohibits personal data 
transfers from the EU to a third-party country unless the country meets 
one of the exceptions listed under Article 26;42 the exceptions fall into 
three categories.  First, Article 26 provides six derogations for transfer 
where it is completed pursuant to the data subject’s consent, is 
necessary for the performance of a contract, required on grounds of 
public importance, or legally required.43  These derogations are fact-
based and are to be interpreted strictly.44  Second, an EU member state 
may authorize transfer to a country where the data controller “adduces 
adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.”45  If the member 
state decides to grant such permission to a third-party country, the state 
                                               
 37. Id. art. 25(2). 
 38. Id. art. 25(4)–(6).  The European Commission is the Executive of the 
European Union and is responsible for developing and implementing EU strategies.  
Organisational Structure, EURO. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-
european-commission/organisational-structure_en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 39. Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 6, ¶ 73. 
 40. An adequacy decision is a finding of “whether a third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection by reason of its domestic law or the of the international 
commitments it has entered into.”  Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection 
of Personal Data in Third Countries, EURO. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2018) [hereinafter Commission Decisions]. 
 41. Directive, supra note 31, art. 25. 
 42. Id. recital 57. 
 43. Id. art. 26, ¶ 1. 
 44. Case C-119/12, Probst v. mr.nexnet GmbH, ¶ 23 (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-119/12&language=EN#. 
 45. Directive, supra note 31, art. 26, ¶ 2. 
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must inform the Commission and other member states.46  Third, 
transfers may also be conducted pursuant to contractual clauses 
referred to as SCCs.  The European Commission approves these 
clauses and they are integrated into data transfer agreements between 
EU and U.S. data controllers.47 
Additionally, the Directive and GDPR provide two important clauses 
regarding law enforcement access to user data.  First, both the 
Directive and GDPR allow for member states to adopt laws and 
regulations restricting rights and obligations when such restriction is 
necessary for national security, defense, or public safety.48  This 
exception allows for the member states to change how data is collected, 
processed, and transferred whenever the member state is able to justify 
such behavior for national security purposes.49  Second, the GDPR 
changes the methodology for U.S. law enforcement to access user data 
stored in EU nations by requiring that production of user data be 
requested pursuant to an international agreement, such as a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).50  When the data is controlled by an EU 
entity, this reflects the standard process that U.S. law enforcement must 
comply with to obtain EU user data.  However, this raises questions as to 
whether the GDPR is memorializing the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Microsoft Ireland, discussed in Section III.B, such that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in that case will be rendered irrelevant. 
2. U.S. data privacy 
The United States takes a different approach to data privacy laws and 
regulations.  Whereas the European Union employs a comprehensive 
approach, the United States uses a sectoral approach, consisting of 
different laws and regulations per commercial sector.51  This approach 
                                               
 46. Id. art. 26, ¶ 3. 
 47. SCCs are also often referred to as Model Contract Clauses (MCCs).  Model Contracts 
for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EURO. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/model-contracts-transfer-
personal-data-third-countries_en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Model Contracts]. 
 48. Directive, supra note 31, art. 13; GDPR, supra note 33, art. 23. 
 49. See Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post 
Schrems, 18 German L.J. 881, 895–99 (2017). 
 50. GDPR, supra note 33, art. 48. 
 51. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. 
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 (1995) (addressing the American anti-
comprehensive model sentiment and analyzing the U.S. privacy law by sector). 
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has resulted in fragmented privacy protections and regulations.52  
Thus, when assessing the adequacy of U.S. privacy protections, it is 
critical to review U.S. law holistically because different protections and 
remedies derive from different areas.53  Key to the cases described 
below in Sections IV.A and IV.B are a myriad of surveillance laws and 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 
a. Challenged surveillance laws and programs 
In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward 
Snowden leaked thousands of documents from the agency and exposed 
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which 
allowed the NSA to target, for intelligence purposes, the communications 
of non-U.S. citizens reasonably believed to be outside of the United States.54 
FISA was enacted by Congress in 1975 “to curb the problem of 
unchecked domestic surveillance and intelligence-gathering abuses 
undertaken by the executive branch in the post-World War II era.”55 Since 
passing the law, Congress has amended it several times, most recently 
through the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA).  The FAA was 
“designed to provide wholesale authorization for a particular kind of 
warrantless electronic surveillance that had become . . . unduly 
cumbersome to pursue on a case-by-case, warrant-driven basis.”56  
Mr. Snowden’s leaks exposed section 702 of FISA,57 which, though requiring 
                                               
 52. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)) (creating an “affirmative and continuing 
obligation” for financial institutions “to respect the privacy of its customers and protect 
the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic information”); The 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 112-278, 126 Stat. 
2480 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)) (providing a framework to 
protect the privacy of student records); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. 
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2012) (regulating the interception and collection of consumer by private 
corporations and law enforcement); Health Information Privacy and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) 45 C.F.R.  § 164.502 (2017) (creating general rules for the use and 
disclosure of patient health information health care providers). 
 53. Written Legal Submission on Behalf of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae at 3, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P), 
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/947821/download. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 56. Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶ 38. 
 57. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
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annual certifications authorizing collection of foreign intelligence 
information, does not require the U.S. government to make a probable 
cause showing that the target is a foreign agent prior to collection.58 
Under section 702, the NSA may conduct what is known as PRISM 
collection.59  In PRISM collection, the U.S. government sends selectors, 
such as an e-mail address, to a U.S. electronic communications service 
provider, such as Google or Yahoo, and compels the service provider 
to share this information.60  The NSA may receive all data collected 
through PRISM, and the Central Intelligence Agency or Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may receive a select portion of the 
collection.61  Each agency has minimization procedures limiting how 
the agency can search and analyze collected data, how long it can be 
maintained, and how it is to be destroyed.62  The procedure is also 
subject to extensive oversight by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the FISA court.63 
Following Snowden’s revelations of this and other collection 
programs, the U.S. government took several steps to reform its 
surveillance programs.  President Obama commissioned a review 
group to provide recommendations to balance U.S. national security 
with its foreign policy interests and its commitment to privacy and civil 
liberties.64  Based on those recommendations, the Obama 
administration released Presidential Policy Directive 28 (“PPD-28”), 
which expands surveillance collection principles usually applied to 
U.S. citizens to foreign nationals.65  PPD-28 limits the situations in 
                                               
SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (2014) [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE REPORT], 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  Mr. Snowden leaked information of the PRISM collection program in 
addition to a number of other surveillance pertaining to both U.S. and non-U.S. 
citizens, including upstream collection, collection of bulk telephony metadata, and 
surveillance of foreign government leaders.  Snowden Revelations, LAWFARE, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) 
(providing a timeline of Edward Snowden’s disclosure of NSA classified information). 
 60. SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 7. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. RICHARD A. CLARK ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:  REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 1 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
 65. Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 
(Jan. 17, 2014). 
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which bulk collection of information may be conducted and outlines 
minimization, retention, and dissemination restrictions on the U.S. 
intelligence community.66 
b. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
Under the ECPA, U.S. law enforcement is also able to access domestic 
and foreign user data, including the content of communications.67  Title 
II of the ECPA is known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and it 
governs the disclosure of user data, content, and non-content to law 
enforcement.68  Section 2703 details the requirements for disclosure of 
user information using search warrants, subpoenas, or § 2703(d) court 
orders.69  While the SCA initially allowed law enforcement to obtain 
user content via a subpoena if the data had been stored for over 180 
days, it is widely recognized that law enforcement is required to obtain 
a warrant to compel user content. 
Two relevant aspects of the SCA are user notice and the use of 
national security letters (“NSLs”).  The SCA, which requires that notice 
of the law enforcement request be provided to the user at some point, 
permits courts to issue an order barring service providers from 
notifying the user of the law enforcement request.70  Often these orders 
are frequently renewed or forgotten about such that they become 
permanent and the user is never notified.71  Additionally, the ECPA also 
expands law enforcement’s use of NSLs, which allow the FBI to compel 
                                               
 66. Id.; see Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶¶ 62–64. 
 67. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 68. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).  
Content is generally considered to include information, such as e-mail messages, while 
non-content information includes transactional or subscriber information.  RICHARD 
M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036, STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT:  REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 
(ECPA) 5 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf.  Transactional 
information generally includes more detailed logging information or email headers.  
Id.  Subscriber information may include subscriber name, address, phone number, 
length of service, or means of payment.  Id. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 70. A 2703(d) order is a combination between a warrant and a subpoena that 
allows law enforcement to obtain transactional information, such as user sign-in logs, 
but not email content.  THOMPSON & COLE, supra note 68, at 5. 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.  See Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered:  Reforming 
ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 325–26 (2012). 
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records from third-party service providers.72  NSLs are accompanied by an 
indefinite gag order73 and prohibit the receiving party from disclosing the 
existence of the NSL unless certain requirements are met.74 
c. Redress mechanisms 
The final and arguably most important change to U.S. privacy and 
surveillance law following the Snowden revelations is the ability of 
foreign nationals to seek redress within U.S. domestic courts for 
alleged privacy violations caused by U.S. surveillance.75  This ability 
highlights basic legal differences in the U.S. and EU legal systems.  
While these differences include concepts such as remedies76 and 
sovereign immunity,77 the most critical distinction is standing.78  
Though the European Union does not require that the protections 
afforded to EU residents in the United States be identical to the 
European Union’s, it does require that the protections be 
commensurate.79  This requirement creates a problem because the 
differing attitudes toward standing may lead the European Union to 
find that U.S. protections are insufficient.80 
                                               
 72. Law enforcement may use four distinct statutes to obtain information from 
providers.  ECPA (electronic communication service providers); Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3422) (financial institutions); National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 
Stat. 495 (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 3001–3234) (government institutions); Fair 
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 111-2 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681). 
 73. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 
IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS:  LEGAL BACKGROUND 9 (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c). 
 75. Draft Decision of the Data Protection Commissioner ¶ 62, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 
414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P) [hereinafter DPC Draft Decision] (emphasizing the lack of 
redress mechanisms in the United States as a key reason for finding SCCs invalid). 
 76. See id. ¶ 51; Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶ 88; see also Fed. 
Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 298 (2012) (finding that under the Privacy 
Act the plaintiff must show pecuniary harm and is limited to damages of $1000 for 
violations of the Act). 
 77. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶¶ 47, 59; Affidavit of Peter Swire, at 7-
4, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P), https://iapp.org/media/ 
pdf/resource_center/Schrems-testimony-Swire.pdf; Affidavit of Stephen I. Vladeck, 
supra note 9, ¶ 84–85. 
 78. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 52. 
 79. EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 11 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/citizens-guide_en.pdf. 
 80. Id. at 13. 
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The primary civil redress mechanism available to U.S. citizens is the 
Privacy Act, which allows plaintiffs to challenge the validity of federal 
agency data collection, prohibits government disclosure to third 
parties, and requires agencies to be transparent about leveraged 
collection systems.81  The Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (JRA) expanded 
these protections to foreign nationals.82  While the JRA creates a legal 
cause of action, a key challenge that each foreign plaintiff will face is 
standing.83  U.S. case law has interpreted standing to require that 
plaintiffs show (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized, 
and actual or imminent; (2) that there is a causal connection between 
the injury and the alleged conduct; and (3) that the injury will be 
redressed by the court’s decision.84  Thus, a party that is unable to make 
this showing, whether a U.S. citizen or foreign national, will be 
precluded from seeking relief. 
Two cases—Clapper v. Amnesty International85 and Spokeo v. Robins86—
are key to analyzing the ability of foreign nationals to bring claims.  In 
Clapper, respondents sought a declaratory judgment that foreign 
collection under FISA was unconstitutional and requested injunction 
against such collection.87  The Supreme Court rejected the 
respondents’ claim that there was an objective likelihood of harm and 
instead found that the respondents could not show that surveillance of 
their communications was actual or imminent.88  Additionally, the 
Court also rejected the respondents’ claim that the organizations must 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of surveillance 
programs because otherwise surveillance would be insulated from 
meaningful judicial review.89  Clapper thus raises questions of how a 
                                               
 81. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 
 82. Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (to be codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a note).  Outside of the JRA, foreign nationals may seek redress under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Privacy Shield, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), or ECPA.  See Affidavit of Peter Swire, supra note 77, at 1-20–1-24. 
 83. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 52; Irish High Court Referral to European 
Court of Justice ¶ 222, Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 4809P) [hereinafter 
ECJ Referral], https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/Judgement3Oct17.pdf. 
 84. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 85. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 86. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 87. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. 
 88. Id. at 422. 
 89. Id. at 420–21. 
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party is able to challenge U.S. surveillance when plaintiffs do not know 
whether they have been surveilled.90 
A corollary case to Clapper is Spokeo v. Robins, in which the respondent 
alleged that a website operator published inaccurate information 
about him in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.91  The 
Supreme Court found that even when there is an alleged violation of 
a statutory right, the plaintiff still has the burden of showing the 
elements of Article III standing.92  In this case, Mr. Robins merely 
alleged a procedural violation but did not adequately show a 
sufficiently concrete injury.93  Thus, a party solely alleging the violation 
of a statutory right without a showing of tangible, actual, and imminent 
harm is precluded from seeking redress in U.S. courts.94 
European courts have taken a different approach to standing when 
it comes to alleged violations of the EU Charter.  EU residents need 
not allege “an adverse consequence” resulting from an interference 
with certain articles within the Charter “to secure redress of a violation” 
of the Charter.95  In the context of surveillance, the European Court of 
Human Rights has also found that EU residents can challenge 
surveillance programs, despite their covert nature, because to preclude 
such a challenge would allow surveillance to remain 
“unchallengeable.”96  The European standard for accessing the courts 
is thus lower than in American courts.  While some have suggested that 
U.S. courts have lowered the bar for standing in the United States due 
to data breach litigation97 or that the bar may be easier for foreign 
                                               
 90. Timothy Egar, Standing, Grandstanding and NSA Surveillance, LAWFARE (Oct. 21, 2015, 
12:22 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/standing-grandstanding-and-nsa-surveillance. 
 91. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
 92. Id. at 1549. 
 93. Id. at 1550 (commenting that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination 
of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 54. 
 96. Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5028/71, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Rep. 214, ¶¶ 30–38 
(1978) (finding that an individual may “claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned 
by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret measures, 
without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him”). 
 97. Professors Vladeck and Swire, among others, have also suggested that the 
recent pull-back in standing requirements for data breach litigation indicates that the 
ruling in Clapper is not a per se ban on cases involving U.S. foreign intelligence.  See Affidavit of 
Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 9, ¶¶ 89–98; Affidavit of Peter Swire, supra note 76, at 7-38. 
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nationals in the context of foreign surveillance,98 EU officials have still 
expressed concerns regarding the availability of redress mechanisms 
because of the standing requirement.99 
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER MECHANISMS 
The law governing cross-border data transfers can be divided into 
two groups:  (1) commercial transfers and (2) law enforcement 
transfers.  As noted, the validity of a commercial transfer from the 
European Union to the United States is dependent upon the adequacy 
of the safeguards surrounding the transfer.  In the case of EU-U.S. 
commercial data transfers, this adequacy was first challenged in Data 
Protection Commissioner v. Schrems (Schrems I).100  In contrast, law 
enforcement access to user information stored in foreign jurisdictions 
is governed by MLATs.  Ultimately, it is the failure of both of these 
mechanisms to ensure safe, effective, and efficient transfer of user 
information that will ultimately cause de facto localization. 
A.  Commercial Data Transfers 
To date only ten countries have received an adequacy decision from 
the European Commission based upon the country’s domestic laws.101  
Unsurprisingly, the United States is not one of these countries.  Thus, 
U.S. companies processing EU users’ personal information must 
transfer data under an international commitment to use adequate 
safeguards, contractual clauses, or one of the derogations listed in 
Article 26 of the Directive. 
Prior to the Schrems I decision, U.S. entities under the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of 
Transportation (DOT)102 could transfer EU user data to and from the 
                                               
 98. Timothy Edgar, More on Standing as a Barrier to Surveillance Challenges:  Bug or 
Feature?, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-
standing-barrier-surveillance-challenges-bug-or-feature. 
 99. See DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 54; see also ECJ Referral, supra note 83, ¶ 222. 
 100. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), 2014 E.C.R. 6. 
 101. See Commission Decisions, supra note 40 (listing Andorra, Argentina, Canada, 
Switzerland, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, and New Zealand as 
nations that provide adequate safeguards for personal data). 
 102. Generally, the FTC has jurisdiction over “acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce by any ‘person, partnership, or corporation.’”  Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Commerce, How to Join Privacy Shield Part I, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=How-to-Join-Privacy-Shield-part-1 (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter How to Join Privacy Shield].  However, this is limited, 
and the FTC does not have jurisdiction “over most depository institutions . . . , 
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European Union under the Safe Harbor Framework.  Adopted in 2000, 
the Safe Harbor Framework was a direct response to the passage of the 
Directive and was designed to limit the negative impact of the inherent 
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy, 
international trade, and investment.103  The Safe Harbor Framework is 
an example of an Article 25 international commitment, negotiated by 
EU-U.S. officials, whereby the United States ensures that the transfers are 
conducted with an adequate level of protection.104  These protections are 
reflected in the Safe Harbor Framework principles, which mirrored key 
concepts in the Directive, such as notice, choice, and security.105  U.S. 
companies processing EU user data were then able to certify 
compliance with the principles and transfer data under the Framework. 
In 2014, Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian privacy advocate, filed a 
case before the Irish Data Protection Agency (DPA) against Facebook’s 
Irish subsidiary arguing that, under EU legal standards, U.S. law failed 
to provide adequate protections against U.S. mass surveillance.106  
Mr. Schrems’s claim was a direct response to the Snowden revelations,107 
and he argued that Facebook’s alleged cooperation with the NSA’s 
PRISM program and involvement in continued mass surveillance was 
a breach of the principles reflected in the Data Protection Acts of 1988 
and 2003108 and the conditions of the Safe Harbor Decision.109 
                                               
telecommunications and interstate transportation common carrier activities, air carriers, 
labor associations, most non-profit organizations, and most packer and stockyard 
activities.”  Id.  The DOT has jurisdiction over U.S. and foreign air carriers.  Id. 
 103. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 32, at 5. 
 104. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation:  Moving Beyond Voluntary 
Codes, 6 ISJLP 355, 390–91 (2011). 
 105. Id. at 391. 
 106. See Written Observations of Applicant ¶¶ 21–23, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 
6, [hereinafter Written Observations] http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/CJEU_subs.pdf. 
 107. See Outline Written Submissions at 2–3, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 
6 (claiming that in “light of the then recent revelations of . . . Edward Snowden and 
admissions by USA authorities that the so-called ‘PRISM’ program existed, it was clear 
that, despite the ‘self-certification’ by Facebook Inc. under the Safe Harbour system 
an ‘adequate protection’ was factually not provided”). 
 108. The Data Protection Acts of 1988 and 2003 are two pieces of Irish 
implementing legislation that give effect to the Directive.  DATA PROT. COMM’R, DATA 
PROTECTION ACTS 1988 AND 2003:  INFORMATION CONSOLIDATION 3 (2009), 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/legal/DPAConsolMay09.pdf. 
 109. Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided 
by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued 
by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215), 25/08/2000 p. 0007-00047. 
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After losing in the lower court,110 Mr. Schrems appealed this decision 
to the Irish High Court of Judicial Review, which found that Mr. 
Snowden’s revelations were credible and that, once personal data was 
transferred to the United States, the NSA and FBI were able to access the 
personal information through mass and indiscriminate surveillance and 
collection of data.111  While the High Court recognized this behavior as 
a violation of Irish constitutional and data protection law, it also 
recognized that the issue ultimately involved the interpretation and 
application of EU law and thus referred the case to the CJEU.112 
In analyzing Mr. Schrems’s claim, the CJEU reviewed the Safe 
Harbor Framework holistically and in conjunction with the Directive.  
It determined that U.S. laws did not provide an adequate level of 
protection essentially equivalent to EU laws because the U.S. 
government permitted generalized access to electronic information 
and failed to provide redress mechanisms.113  Ultimately, the CJEU 
struck down the Safe Harbor as a valid mechanism for transfers from 
the European Union to the United States.114 
Following the invalidation of the Framework in Schrems I, the 
decision had several impacts on EU-U.S. relations.  The immediate 
consequence of the CJEU’s decision was that all data transfers from the 
United States to the European Union under the Safe Harbor regime 
were now in violation of the Directive.115  However, the Directive still 
allowed companies to use SCCs or other derogations (e.g., consent) as 
an alternative transfer mechanisms.116 
Companies were able to use these alternatives until the European 
Union and United States successfully negotiated the Privacy Shield.117  
                                               
 110. Written Observations, supra note 106, ¶ 1 (explaining that existing safe harbor 
laws protect data transferred from the EU to the United States). 
 111. Opinion of Advocate General Bot ¶ 36, Case C-362/14, Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. 6. 
 112. Id. ¶ 40. 
 113. Schrems I, 2014 E.C.R. ¶¶ 81–82, 93, 95; Charter of Rights, supra note 26, art. 7. 
 114. McCann Fitzgerald, Commercial Court Affirms Legal Principles on Admission of an 
Amicus Curiae, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=8be84b34-c0b7-4a66-9542-fdde0db0e269. 
 115. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Transfer of Personal Data from the EU to the United States of American Under Directive 
95/46/EC following the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems), at 4 COM 
(2015) 566 final (Nov. 6, 2015). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See supra notes 49–101. 
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Known as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,118 this agreement sought to 
remedy the problems illuminated in Schrems I and allow individual 
companies to self-certify their commitment to the Privacy Shield 
Principles.119  Similar to the Safe Harbor Framework, the Privacy Shield 
requires that certified parties implement and maintain adequate 
safeguards for transfer.120  These requirements are outlined in the 
Privacy Shield Principles and include concepts such as notice, choice, 
accountability for onward transfer, security, data integrity, purpose 
limitation, access, recourse, enforcement, and liability.121 
The Privacy Shield also specifically sought to address gaps noted in 
Schrems I by requiring specific measures for the maintenance of data 
transfers and storage, providing access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and ensuring accountability of data providers.122  More 
specifically, the Privacy Shield requires strict user notice requirements, 
provides user data access rights, and extends guarantees under the 
Privacy Act to EU citizens.123  The Privacy Shield also created five 
redress mechanisms, which have since been implemented in the 
                                               
 118. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES ISSUED 
BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 1, https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/ 
servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004qAg (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (discussing the 
general principles of Privacy Shield). 
 119. Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Privacy Shield Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD 
FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Requirements of Participation, 
PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Requirements-
of-Participation (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 122. See Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Key New Requirements:  EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield Framework Key New Requirements for Participating Companies, PRIVACY SHIELD 
FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Key-New-Requirements (last visited Feb. 7, 
2018). 
 123. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (to be codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a) (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State[,] or local 
government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided 
by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account 
number”); SHARA MONTELEONE & LAURA PUCCIO, EURO. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH 
SERV., PE 595.892, FROM SAFE HARBOUR TO PRIVACY SHIELD:  ADVANCES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS TO THE NEW EU-US DATA TRANSFER RULES 23–24 (2017) (clarifying that 
Privacy Shield “transforms this principle into a fully-fledged right of data subjects”); 
Privacy Shield:  Impact of Trump’s Executive Order, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (Jan. 28, 2017), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/01/28/privacy-shield-impact-of-trumps-
executive-order. 
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United States through the JRA.124  From a national security perspective, 
as a part of the Privacy Shield negotiations, the United States also 
declassified minimization procedures under section 702 of FISA125 and 
expanded the privacy protections in the PPD-28 to better align 
American practice with European expectations.126 
On July 12, 2016, the European Commission issued its adequacy 
decision regarding the Privacy Shield, finding that the new framework 
ensured an adequate level of protection for data transfers.127  While 
this decision was well received by U.S. and EU businesses, the Privacy 
Shield has been widely criticized,128 with EU commentators calling into 
question the long-term validity of the agreement.129 
Finally, as a part of the EU-U.S. negotiations, the European Union 
and the United States also agreed that the Privacy Shield would 
                                               
 124. See Sheila Miller & Tracy P. Marshall, Obama Signs Judicial Redress Act—Will It 
Move EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Forward?, NAT’L LAW REV. (Feb. 27, 2016) 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/obama-signs-judicial-redress-act-will-it-move-
eu-us-privacy-shield-forward (noting that the redress mechanisms allow EU citizens to 
seek redress remedies from the federal government in U.S. courts for alleged privacy 
violations); see also Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (to 
be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a note). 
 125. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1782 
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885); see Minimization Procedures Used by the 
National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information 
Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended, ODNI 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization 
%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%2
0SECT%20702.pdf (discussing the declassification procedures). 
 126. See Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 
(Jan. 17, 2014). 
 127. See Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 Pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of 
Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, art. 1, ¶ 13, C (2016) 4176 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-
decision_en.pdf (“Based on the findings developed in recitals (136)–(140), the 
Commission concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection 
for personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield from the Union to self-
certified organisations in the United States.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Jan Philipp Albrecht, EU-US Privacy Shield:  EU Commission Signs Blank 
Cheque for Data Transfers, EURO. FREE ALLIANCE (July 12, 2016 https://www.greens-
efa.eu/en/article/press/eu-us-privacy-shield (arguing that the Privacy Shield does not 
address the concerns outlined in the CJEU Safe Harbor decisions); Jedidiah Bradley, 
Model Clauses in Jeopardy with Irish DPA Referral to CJEU, IAPP (May 25, 2016), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/model-clauses-in-jeopardy-with-irish-dpa-referral-to-cjeu 
(commenting on the Article 29 Working Group’s criticisms and the inability of an 
Article 31 group to reach an agreement on the Privacy Shield). 
 129. See MONTELEONE & PUCCIO, supra note 123, at 31–32. 
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undergo an annual review to ensure that it continues to meet adequacy 
standards.130  If, through a review, the Commission finds that the 
Privacy Shield fails to maintain adequate protections, the Commission 
can use the review as the basis to re-negotiate parts or all of the Privacy 
Shield.131  The first review of the Privacy Shield was conducted in 
September 2017; while all parts of the Privacy Shield were upheld,132 the 
Commission commented that there was still room for improvement.133 
Since the EU Commission’s adequacy determination for the Privacy 
Shield was rendered, its validity has been challenged twice.  Digital 
Rights Ireland134 brought the first challenge on September 16, 2016, in 
EU General Court seeking the annulment of the determination on the 
basis that the Shield failed to provide sufficient substantive changes 
from the Safe Harbor Framework.135  This challenge was dismissed on 
November 22, 2017, for lack of admissibility.136  However, a French 
advocacy group, La Quadrature du Net,137 has also challenged the 
Commission’s decision and is arguing that the Shield not only 
continues to violate the Charter, but also fails to provide effective 
                                               
 130. Letter from Ken Hyatt, Deputy Under Sec’y for Int’l Trade, Int’l Trade Admin., 
to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equal., European 
Comm’n (July 7, 2016), https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload? 
file=015t00000004q0v (agreeing to a joint review mechanism as a part of the Privacy 
Shield’s implementation). 
 131. Tom De Cordier et al., EU-US Privacy Shield Under High Scrutiny, LEXOLOGY 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a7550caf-cfa2-
4717-b266-c7dc3c5a9f15. 
 132. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (Oct. 18, 2017), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0611&from=EN. 
 133. Press Release, European Comm’n, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield:  First Review Shows 
It Works but Implementation Can Be Improved (Oct. 18, 2017), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3966_en.htm. 
 134. Digital Rights Ireland is a non-profit organization dedicated to “[c]ivil, 
[h]uman and [l]egal rights in a digital age.”  About Digital Rights Ireland, DIGITAL RIGHTS 
IR, https://www.digitalrights.ie/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  The organization 
actively files constitutional challenges against the Irish government in relation to 
internet and telephone regulations and policies.  Id. 
 135. Action Brought on 16 September 2016—Digital Rights Ir. v. Comm’n (Case T-
670/16,), ¶ 8, 2016 O.J. (C 410) 26, 27, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2016.410.01.0026.01.ENG. 
 136. Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ir. v. Comm’r, ¶¶ 45–54 (Nov. 22, 2017), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=197141&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=30038. 
 137. Who Are We?, LA QUADRATURE DU NET, https://www.laquadrature.net/en/who-
are-we (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
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redress mechanisms.138  While this case is in its infant stages, it will likely 
work its way up to the CJEU, and the outcomes of Schrems II and 
Microsoft Ireland will certainly impact the CJEU’s decision. 
While the Privacy Shield provides a mechanism for companies to certify 
use of adequate safeguards, the Shield only applies to companies under 
the FTC’s or DOT’s jurisdiction.139  Companies not falling under this 
jurisdiction have generally relied upon SCCs, which provide an 
adequate basis for transfer under Article 26(2) of the Directive.140  The 
European Commission has rendered two sets of clauses adequate, and 
entities are able to insert these clauses verbatim into their data transfer 
contracts.141  However, in Schrems II, discussed below in Section IV.A, 
Mr. Schrems is challenging the adequacy of these clauses.142 
B. Law Enforcement Access 
U.S. local, state, and federal law enforcement entities are able to 
compel user data maintained in foreign jurisdictions using the MLAT 
process.143  MLATs are bilateral and regional treaties governing both 
U.S. law enforcement’s acquisition of user data from foreign 
jurisdictions and vice-versa.144  These treaties provide a mechanism for 
U.S. law enforcement to obtain personal data of foreign individuals 
held under a foreign jurisdiction’s law.145 
To obtain records via the MLAT process, a domestic prosecutor, 
whether in the United States or abroad, must first ensure that the 
request meets local warrant or subpoena standards.146  Thus, when 
                                               
 138. Case T-738/16, Action Brought on 25 October 2016—La Quadrature du Net 
and Others v. Comm’n (Case T-738/16), ¶ 1–2, 2017 O.J. (C 6) 39, 39, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016TN0738. 
 139. How to Join Privacy Shield, supra note 102. 
 140. Model Contracts, supra note 47. 
 141. Top Ten—EU Data Transfers:  Comparing the Proposed Privacy Shield to the Standard 
Contractual Clauses, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (May 24, 2016), http://www.acc.com/ 
legalresources/publications/topten/transferring-personal-data.cfm. 
 142. See infra Section II.B. 
 143. Virginia M. Kendall & T. Markus Funk, The Role of Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties in Obtaining Foreign Evidence, LITIG., Winter 2014, at 59, 60 (2014) (describing 
MLATs as a “well-worn tool in the prosecutor’s toolbox”). 
 144. ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS:  MUTUAL 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 3 (2015), https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/ 
sites/default/files/GNI%20MLAT%20Report.pdf. 
 145. See id. (describing a hypothetical where Indian law enforcement officials seek 
to obtain email records from a U.S. company and use the MLATs to retrieve the data). 
 146. Yonatan L. Moskowitz, MLATS and the Trusted Nation Club:  The Proper Cost of 
Membership, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2016). 
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seeking to serve a warrant on the foreign jurisdiction, a U.S. prosecutor 
must first meet domestic probable cause standards and obtain a 
warrant before sending the request to the foreign jurisdiction.147  
When foreign entities seek user data held in the United States, foreign 
requests for user data must first make a probable cause showing and 
comply with the terms of the relevant MLAT and the ECPA.148  
Whether the request meets these standards is determined by the DOJ’s 
Office of International Affairs, the relevant DOJ field office and district 
court in the company’s jurisdiction, and by the company itself.149 
While this process ensures constitutional protections for user data in the 
jurisdiction in which it is maintained, it also creates extensive 
delays.150  Requests from the United States to access data held in a foreign 
jurisdiction, regardless of the type of legal process, can take anywhere from 
six weeks to ten months or longer.151  Thus, many critics have argued that 
the MLAT system is archaic, inefficient, and needs substantial reform.152 
III. CASES 
At the time of writing, two relevant cases are pending before the 
CJEU and U.S. Supreme Court.  In these cases, parties are challenging 
cross-border data transfers on the basis of privacy concerns and the 
alleged scope of law enforcement access to data. 
                                               
 147. Id. 
 148. See Foreign Government Access to User Data, KATE WESTMORELAND, 
http://www.katewestmoreland.com/new-page-1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (explaining 
the full process of MLAT requests). 
 149. MARK A. RUSH & JARED A. KEPHART, K & L GATES, LIFTING THE VEIL ON THE MLAT 
PROCESS:  A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO MLA REQUESTS 4 (2017), 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/669681d7-12d7-451e-8240-
a33cf67c959f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec5fc22d-3e3c-4607-bcb3-
f4e99e3f59b4/GE_Alert_01202017.pdf. 
 150. Id. at 8. 
 151. See Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reforms:  Some Thoughts from Civil Society, LAWFARE 
(Sept. 11, 2015, 12:22 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-
thoughts-civil-society (noting that the process is designed to protect rights, but this 
results in delays that incentivize countries to find faster ways of accessing data). 
 152. See id. (arguing that other countries have difficulty complying with the U.S. 
standard for MLATs and that the three main issues with such requests are lack of 
protection for metadata requests, the time delay of processing, and the reduction in 
the amount of data shared through the response process). 
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A. Schrems II 
After Schrems I, Mr. Schrems filed a second complaint with the Irish 
DPA challenging the validity of the SCCs.153  Referred to as “Schrems II,” 
the case claims that the SCCs do not adequately protect data transfers 
to the United States because such data can still be surveilled by U.S. 
intelligence authorities.154 
 Procedurally, this case is unusual.155  Following Mr. Schrems’s 
application, the Irish Data Protection Commission commenced an 
investigation into the adequacy standards of U.S. laws under the 
Directive.156  To assist in the investigation, the Commissioner sought 
the opinions from independent experts.157  The Commissioner 
determined that while remedies for redress may be available to EU 
residents, such remedies were fragmented.  Additionally, because the 
SCCs were not binding on U.S. law enforcement, there was no guarantee 
that they would actually be able to protect EU user data from unbridled 
law enforcement access.158  Ultimately, the Commissioner concluded 
that while she questioned the validity of the clauses under the EU 
Charter, she was unable to render a final decision until the Irish High 
Court or the CJEU rendered a decision on the validity of the clauses.159 
The Irish High Court took up the case and reviewed the 
Commissioner’s draft decision.  Ultimately, the High Court concurred 
with the Commissioner’s finding regarding the validity of the SCCs.160  
The High Court, however, also found itself in a jurisdictional bind 
because a dismissal of the case would be tacit approval of the SCCs.161  On 
October 3, 2017, the Irish High Court formally referred Schrems II to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the SCCs.162  While there 
is no timeline for the completion of this case, given that eighty-eight 
                                               
 153. See Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414, ¶ 2 (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.); see also Jedidiah Bracy, Model 
Clauses in Jeopardy with Irish DPA Referral to CJEU, IAPP (May 25, 2016), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/model-clauses-in-jeopardy-with-irish-dpa-referral-to-cjeu. 
 154. Schrems II, [2016] IEHC 414, ¶ 3. 
 155. See Judgment of Justice Costello, Schrems II [2016] No. 4809 P. (Hi. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 156. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 157. DPC Draft Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 42. 
 158. Id. ¶ 61. 
 159. Id. ¶ 63. 
 160. ECJ Referral, supra note 83, ¶ 333. 
 161. Id. ¶¶ 333–34. 
 162. Id. ¶ 5; see Commission Decision 2011/497/EC of June 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 
19; Commission Decision 2004/915/EC of 27 December 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74; 
Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5. 
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percent of companies use SCCs to transfer personal data from the 
European Union to the United States, this case will be heavily watched.163 
B.  Microsoft Corp. v. United States (Microsoft Ireland) 
The final case impacting cross-border data transfers of user data is 
the Microsoft Ireland case, now before the U.S. Supreme Court.164  In 
this case, U.S. law enforcement sought to compel the production of 
two Microsoft email accounts.165  While the warrants were properly 
served upon Microsoft in Washington, the data sought was stored in 
Microsoft’s data center166 in Dublin, Ireland.167  Microsoft filed a 
motion to quash, arguing that the SCA did not authorize federal courts 
to compel the production of data stored outside of the United States.168  
The Southern District of New York rejected this argument, and 
Microsoft promptly appealed.169 
The Second Circuit reversed and held that an SCA warrant could 
not compel data stored in a foreign jurisdiction.170  Using basic 
statutory analysis, the Second Circuit determined that the primary 
focus of the SCA is the privacy of stored communications, and thus,171 
courts should apply the law of the jurisdiction where the invasion of 
                                               
 163. Lee Matheson, Understanding “Schrems 2.0,” IAPP (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/understanding-schrems-2-0. 
 164. Andrew Keane Woods, A Primer on Microsoft Ireland, the Supreme Court’s 
Extraterritorial Warrant Case, LAWFARE (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-microsoft-ireland-supreme-courts-
extraterritorial-warrant-case. 
 165. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that Microsoft 
“move[d] to quash a search warrant to the extent that it direct[ed] Microsoft to 
produce the contents of one of its customer’s e-mails where that information is stored 
on a server located in Dublin, Ireland”), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), petition for 
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 166. A data center is a location where computer servers, containing any form of 
computerized information, are kept.  How a Data Center Works, SAP, 
http://www.sapdatacenter.com/article/data_center_functionality (last visited Feb. 7, 
2018).  A corporation may have a server room or use a data center, depending upon 
the size of the company and the number of servers in the enterprise.  Id.  Key 
characteristics of data centers include redundant power supplies, cooling systems, and 
controlled access.  Id. 
 167. Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468. 
 168. Id. at 470. 
 169. Id. at 476. 
 170. Id. at 222. 
 171. Id. at 216–17. 
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privacy occurred.172  According to the Second Circuit, because the actual 
intrusion into the user’s privacy occurred in the Irish data center, the 
court ruled that Irish law would apply instead of the SCA.173  
Consequently, U.S. law enforcement must obtain a MLAT to the foreign 
jurisdiction in order to obtain user data held by U.S. companies abroad.174 
Since the Second Circuit’s holding, nine magistrate and district 
court judges across the United States have considered and rejected the 
Second Circuit’s conclusion.175  In these cases, the courts found that 
the SCA did not apply extraterritorially and that the invasion of the 
user’s privacy occurred in the United States, where the disclosure of 
the information occurred, rather than in the foreign jurisdiction.176 
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision, the U.S. Solicitor 
General filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.177  
                                               
 172. Id. at 217–20 (determining the focus of the SCA after reviewing the plain text, 
procedural provisions, and legislative history of the statute). 
 173. Id. at 220. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., No. 5:17-mj-532-HNJ, 2017 WL 
4022806, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to 
Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at *6, 11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017); In re Search 
of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 
WL 3478809, at *2, 5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with 
[redacted]@gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-
mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *1, 27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017); In re Search of 
Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 2:16-mj-
02197-DUTY-1, 2017 WL 3263351, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2017); In re Search Warrant 
to Google, Inc., No 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *12 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Two 
Email Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *3–4 (E.D. 
Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search of Premises Located at [redacted]@yahoo.com, No. 
6:17-mj-1238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017), slip op. 3; In re Info. Associated with One Yahoo 
Email Address That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017 
WL 706307, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017). 
 176. Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc., No. 5:17-mj-532-HNJ, 2017 WL 4022806, at 
*3, 9; Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at *10; 
Search of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 
WL 3478809, at *5; Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com that Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-00757 (BAH), 2017 WL 3445634, at *5, 25; 
Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *9, 11; Two Email 
Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *4; Search of Info. 
Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 2:16-mj-02197-DUTY-1, 
2017 WL 3263351, at *8–9; Info. Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that Is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017 WL 706307, at *3. 
 177. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). 
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Similar to the lower courts, the Solicitor General argued that the 
Second Circuit’s logic is incorrect because the focus of the SCA is on 
the disclosure by the company, not the privacy of the stored 
communications.178  Thus, according to the Solicitor General, the 
court should have used the law of the jurisdiction where the company 
disclosed the communication to U.S. law enforcement, rather than the 
law where the privacy violation occurred.179 
On October 16, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for this 
case.180  While commentators tend to believe that the Court will side 
with the U.S. government, there are troubling implications for either 
side’s success.181  If the Court sides with Microsoft, law enforcement will 
be required to use MLATs to compel data held by U.S. companies in 
foreign jurisdictions.182  Alternatively, a decision for the U.S. 
government may undermine the success of U.S. interests in Schrems II 
because the U.S. government will be applying U.S. law to EU residents 
rather than EU law, thus increasing the optics that U.S. law 
enforcement has unrestrained access to EU user data.183 
Whereas the CJEU data privacy cases limit the cross-border movement 
of user data for commercial purposes, the Microsoft Ireland case could limit 
law enforcement access to user data held by U.S. corporations in foreign 
jurisdictions.  However, the cases are linked in two key ways.  First, for 
a company to comply with a domestic court order for data held in a 
                                               
 178. Id. at 12. 
 179. Id. at 14. 
 180. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari). 
 181. Jennifer Daskal, There’s No Good Decision in the Next Big Data Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-privacy-
court.html (outlining the immediate consequences of the Court’s decision). 
 182. See Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Second Circuit Ruling Gives Data Privacy 
Bill Momentum in Congress (July 14, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/2016/7/second-circuit-ruling-gives-data-privacy-bill-momentum-in-
congress (praising the Second Circuit decision because it will encourage the use of 
MLATs in obtaining information stored abroad). 
 183. See Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1–4, United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 
356 (2017) (mem.) (No. 17-2), 2017 WL 6383224, at *14 [hereinafter Brief of the 
European Commission] (describing the European Union’s interest in the case and the 
relevant EU laws relevant to the Court’s decision); Lee Matheson, European Commission 
Weighs in on Microsoft Ireland Case, IAPP (Dec. 17, 2017), https://iapp.org/ 
news/a/european-commission-weighs-in-on-microsoft-ireland-case (commenting that 
while the EU amici appear not to support either side before the Supreme Court, there 
is a strong implication that the European Union would like the Supreme Court to 
force U.S. law enforcement to rely upon the existing MLAT system). 
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foreign jurisdiction, the company must transfer the data from the 
foreign jurisdiction to the United States in order to disclose the 
information to U.S. law enforcement.  If the data is stored in the European 
Union, this transfer automatically implicates either the use of the 
Privacy Shield, SCCs, or other tools for transfers.  Second, because the 
Microsoft Ireland case also impacts the scope of law enforcement’s access 
to user data, the decision will be considered in the CJEU’s decision in 
Schrems II and other challenges to the Privacy Shield.184 
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A holding for Mr. Schrems and Microsoft in Schrems II and Microsoft 
Ireland, respectively, and a successful challenge to the Privacy Shield 
will ultimately require companies to localize data to ensure compliance 
with de facto localization regimes.  This localization will ultimately 
undermine user data privacy and security by removing Fourth 
Amendment protections from user data and limiting the ability of 
companies to effectively implement scalable security tools. 
A. Impact of Localization 
If the respective high courts affirm Schrems II and Microsoft Ireland, 
those decisions will advance data localization in two ways:  (1) by 
removing legal cross-border data transfer mechanisms for commercial 
data transfers and (2) by assigning territoriality to data for law 
enforcement purposes.  On their own, the CJEU cases facilitate 
localization by highlighting the fundamental differences in EU and 
U.S. approaches to privacy by explicitly calling the U.S. approach 
inadequate—not once, but twice.  Further, because the SCCs and 
Privacy Shield are based on the same adequacy standard, the 
invalidation of the SCCs would also bolster any challenge to the Privacy 
Shield and make it very difficult for the CJEU to uphold the latter 
framework.  Thus, despite the changes made by the United States 
following the invalidation of the Safe Harbor regime, a further 
invalidation of the SCCs and the Privacy Shield would suggest that the 
privacy differences between the United States and the European 
Union are irreconcilable.  The Microsoft Ireland case furthers the trend 
toward data localization by ensuring that the law of the territory where 
                                               
 184. Brief of the European Commission, supra note 183, at *14 (noting that under 
the GDPR, compliance with a foreign court order does not make the transfer lawful). 
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data is held controls law enforcement access to this data.185  For 
practical purposes, U.S. companies must retain data in one country 
once the data is created because each cross-border transfer would 
require a new MLAT.186  While the cases individually restrict the flow 
of data across borders, taken together, the cases effectively erect 
territorial boundaries and limit the ability of companies and law 
enforcement agencies to move and access data. 
1. The CJEU data privacy cases and data localization 
If the CJEU finds that the SCCs and the Privacy Shield are invalid, 
the United States has two options:  (1) legislate greater privacy 
protections to meet EU standards or (2) localize data.187  Given the 
extent of the changes already made, it seems unlikely that Congress 
would legislate in favor of greater privacy protections.188  As a part of 
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield negotiations, the United States revised 
numerous laws and implemented various protections to increase the 
privacy protections for EU citizens’ data.189  Additionally, as reflected 
in the Irish Data Protection Commissioner’s draft decision in 
                                               
 185. See supra notes 165–72 and accompanying text (discussing how the court in the 
Microsoft Ireland case found that the place where the intrusion of privacy occurred is 
the jurisdiction that should control the matter, so American law enforcement must 
follow the appropriate jurisdiction’s laws to obtain user information held by U.S. 
companies operating overseas). 
 186. See Jennifer Daskal, The Microsoft Warrant Case:  The Policy Issues, JUST SECURITY 
(Sept. 8, 2015, 12:48 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25901/microsoft-warrant-
case-policy-issues (commenting on the unstable nature of data, which makes it difficult 
for law enforcement to obtain it from any party outside of the United States). 
 187. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY STATEMENT ON THE DECISION 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 1 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_s
hield_en.pdf (criticizing the Privacy Shield for not providing stricter guarantees); see 
also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1149 (4th ed. 
2011) (commenting on the compromises made by the European Union in drafting 
the Safe Harbor Agreement because of a recognition that the United States would not 
pass comprehensive privacy laws). 
 188. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:  WORLD DATA 
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 151, 178, 173 
(1998) (explaining that it is clear to Europeans that the United States will not pass 
comprehensive data privacy laws); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-
Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 737–38 (2001) (arguing that the Directive will 
create a bifurcated system of privacy in the United States, where EU citizens are 
provided with greater privacy than American citizens under U.S. law). 
 189. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
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Schrems II,190 several issues of contention turn on key constitutional 
differences, such as Article III standing.191  While the Commissioner 
may have misinterpreted some of these doctrines,192 by targeting these 
long-standing principles of U.S. jurisprudence, the European Union 
has given the United States an ultimatum to either adjust basic tenants 
of U.S. law or refrain from transferring data.  It is thus questionable 
whether the United States is able to give anything more at the 
negotiating table without overturning decades of legal precedents. 
Additionally, from a national security perspective, any further U.S. 
concessions would subject the United States to greater restrictions than 
its EU counterparts.193  For example, following Schrems I, the United 
States amended FISA, declassified the minimization procedures of 
§ 702, and expanded the limitations principles of PPD-28 to non-U.S. 
citizens, limiting both the practice and appearance of unrestrained 
government access to user information and content.194  These protections 
are commensurate or exceed those provided by the European Union’s 
Directive and GDPR, which allow member states to adopt legislation 
restricting the scope of privacy rights when necessary to protect 
national security.195  However, because it is unlikely that the United 
States can or will make any further changes to its laws that will satisfy EU 
authorities, including the European Commission and member state 
                                               
 190. Following Mr. Schrems’s initial complaint, the Data Protection Commissioner 
launched an investigation into the allegations.  The results of this investigation were 
circulated in a draft with the parties.  See McCann FitzGerald, Commercial Court Affirms 
Legal Principles on Admission of an Amicus Curiae, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8be84b34-c0b7-4a66-9542-
fdde0db0e269. 
 191. Id. ¶¶ 56, 79, 84 (stating how some U.S. companies have gotten around Fourth 
Amendment issues through exceptions to the warrant clause, such as the foreign 
intelligence surveillance exception and the third-party doctrine). 
 192. Id. ¶ 79. 
 193. See Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, Why the U.S. Is Held to a Higher Data 
Protection Standard than France, IAPP (Nov. 2, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/why-the-
u-s-is-held-to-a-higher-data-protection-standard-than-france (discussing how the 
French Patriot Act would fail the adequacy test applied to U.S. laws in Schrems); 
Timothy Edgar, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner:  Some Inconvenient Truths the 
European Court of Justice Ignores, LAWFARE (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:08 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/schrems-v-data-protection-commissioner-some-
inconvenient-truths-european-court-justice-ignores (arguing that the European Union 
should review the surveillance laws of its own member states before passing judgment 
on the laws of others). 
 194. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Kuner, supra note 49, at 896–97. 
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governments, companies will likely be forced to localize data because 
there is simply no longer a valid scalable mechanism for transfer.196 
2. Microsoft Ireland and data localization 
Although the CJEU data privacy cases impact the movement of user 
data for commercial purposes, Microsoft Ireland restricts the movement 
of user data for law enforcement purposes.  By finding that the privacy 
violation occurs at the data center rather than from where disclosure 
occurs, the Second Circuit’s decision links data to the territory where 
the data is held.197  This decision creates practical problems for U.S. 
law enforcement seeking to access data through valid legal processes 
and incentivizes foreign governments to implement localization 
regimes.  First, the holding requires U.S. law enforcement to obtain an 
MLAT prior to getting data from U.S. entities storing data abroad, and 
each MLAT is specific to a country.198  That means that if a company 
transfers the data across borders prior to the execution of the MLAT,199 
the MLAT is no longer valid and law enforcement must comply with 
an entirely new set of laws.  Practically, this gap allows companies to 
continually move data across borders in real time and effectively evade 
compliance by consistently pointing law enforcement to an alternative 
jurisdiction.  Thus, if the data does not stop moving across jurisdictions, 
                                               
 196. Id. at 917–18 (noting that the United States wants the European Union “to 
make it easier to transfer personal data internationally . . . .  This has produced 
resentment in the EU about the extent of US lobbying on data protection, and in the 
US about pressure from the EU to change its law”). 
 197. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 390 (2015) 
(discussing the conflict in the case that “pits the location for data against the location 
of access, requiring an answer as to which controls”). 
 198. See supra Section II.B. 
 199. See ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW 
LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD ACCESS DATA ACROSS BORDERS 13 (2017), 
http://www2.itif.org/2017-law-enforcement-data-borders.pdf?_ga=2.185940128.8217 
11203.1515263369-2004149087.1515263369 (noting how modern data storage often 
causes data to be split amongst multiple locations, so using the physical location in 
which data is stored to determine access forces law enforcement to initiate a separate 
MLAT request to view the data in each physical location); Dillon Reisman, Where Is 
Your Data, Really?:  The Technical Case Against Data Localization, LAWFARE (May 22, 2017, 
7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-really-technical-case-
against-data-localization (suggesting that since it is practically impossible for users to 
know where their data is stored, it will also be extremely difficult for law enforcement 
to know where necessary data is located such that an MLAT could be served). 
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law enforcement will be significantly hindered from acquiring data 
essential to criminal and national security investigations.200 
Second, because the foreign jurisdiction’s law now controls law 
enforcement’s access to the information, countries may be 
incentivized to formalize the Second Circuit’s ruling by mandating that 
data be held within territorial boundaries of the state.  This would 
allow the foreign state to not only centralize the information but also 
change the laws and standards regulating access.201  Thus, because the 
Second Circuit’s holding elevates the position of foreign law and puts 
the foreign government in greater control of law enforcement’s ability 
to access data within its territorial borders, the Microsoft Ireland holding 
provides a platform on which foreign governments can build more 
restrictive data localization laws and regulations. 
B. Privacy Impact 
Data localization undermines user privacy by granting foreign 
governments greater access to user data, limiting the ability of U.S. 
companies to defend fundamental rights abroad, and monopolizing 
the competitive market for privacy controls.  Confining data within a 
territorial jurisdiction brings information directly under the control of a 
government such that the government can arbitrarily change the rules of 
access.202  Then, because of the foreign government’s access, corporations 
have less ability to protect users globally.203  Data localization also reduces 
the market power of user choice by reducing the number of companies 
in any one particular market.204  Thus, there are several ways that 
localization benefits foreign governments at the cost of user privacy. 
                                               
 200. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 199, at 13 (explaining that if a company 
wanted to impede investigation of data, it could continue splitting the data into 
hundreds of pieces, “creating a labyrinthine environment for law enforcement 
agencies” trying to get data). 
 201. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (noting how limiting data 
geographically allows local governments to control the regulation of the data). 
 202. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 735 (commenting that “[t]he end result of 
data localization is to bring information increasingly under the control of the local 
authorities, regardless of whether that was originally intended”). 
 203. See Daskal, supra note 17, at 478 (arguing that data localization laws “also 
facilitate domestic surveillance by authorizing law enforcement to compel production 
of data wherever located, based on the requesting country’s own laws”); Woods, supra 
note 23, at 753 (explaining the pros and cons of state direct access to companies by 
discussing an incident where South Korean authorities raided Google’s South Korea offices). 
 204. See infra notes 212–15. 
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First, the current MLAT system exports Fourth Amendment 
protections worldwide.205  When seeking information through the 
MLAT process, foreign law enforcement must show that the legal 
process is in compliance with the U.S. Constitution, the ECPA, and the 
controlling MLAT.206  This level of privacy protection is higher than 
the standards used in many other liberal and authoritarian nations.207  
However, once domestic law of the foreign nation controls production 
of user data from U.S. companies, these countries can reduce the level 
of protection required for law enforcement to obtain the information, 
a standard that could be changed based upon a shift in political 
winds.208  This is especially dangerous when considered in the national 
security context, such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks.209  Following the 
                                               
 205. Jennifer Daskal, Professor, American Univ., Panelist at the American 
Enterprise Institute Conference on Domestic Surveillance on Foreign Shores:  The 
Case of Microsoft’s Servers in Ireland 10 (Oct. 6, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Transcript.pdf). 
 206. See Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both the EU and the U.S. Are 
“Stricter” than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information, 66 EMORY 
L.J. 617, 623 (2017) (stating that foreign governments have to meet the standards of 
the ECPA and other U.S. laws to gain access to electronic evidence held by U.S. 
companies); RUSH & KEPHART, supra note 149, at 4 (discussing how U.S. district courts 
are responsible for ensuring MLAT requests are valid under the both the treaty and 
the U.S. Constitution before granting the requests); see also Foreign Government Access to 
User Data, supra note 148. 
 207. See Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 214, ¶ 75 (1978) (finding that judicial 
review is not required prior to intercepting communications); Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 
supra note 206, at 644–45 (commenting on the strength of the probable cause and 
probable cause “plus” standards required for search warrants and wiretaps in the 
United States in comparison to other countries); Jennifer Granick, The Microsoft 
Ireland Case and the Future of Digital Privacy, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2016, 12:46 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/32076/microsoft-ireland-case-future-digital-privacy 
(noting that the United States’ “warrant requirement and . . . wiretapping procedures 
. . . are generally comparatively stringent,” as compared to EU counterparts); see also 
WINSTON MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, A GLOBAL REALITY:  GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS 
TO DATA IN THE CLOUD 8–9 (2012) (discussing the German system in which German 
prosecutors can request certain data from telecommunications services providers if the 
information would be helpful to public safety, which can be done upon demand 
without a court order). 
 208. See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of 
Globalized Communications:  The Analogy to the VISA Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 687, 710 (2016); see Daskal, supra note 17, at 490 (emphasizing two likely 
scenarios:  one is that nations could “race to the bottom” by ignoring foreign citizens’ 
data privacy rights, and the other is that foreign governments could enact blocking 
statutes in order to protect their citizen’s data). 
 209. See generally Charlie Hebdo Attack:  Three Days of Terror, BBC (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 (describing the incident on 
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attacks, France passed a sweeping surveillance law, referred to as the 
French Patriot Act, that enables “intelligence agencies to tap phones 
and emails without seeking permission from a judge.”210  While the 
French Patriot Act may be unique because of the context in which it 
was created, it is not extraordinary in what it attempts to do.  Liberal 
and authoritarian governments have used national security events to 
alter the level required for law enforcement access to information.  
This legal malleability invariably threatens user privacy more once the 
data is centralized under the government’s control.211 
Finally, data localization regulations will limit the number of service 
providers within a jurisdiction and create a monopoly on privacy 
controls within a country.212  Currently, users have the ability to choose 
which service providers to use.213  This has created a market where 
corporations must compete for users, and their key currency is user 
trust.214  As such, companies that fail to maintain user trust by not 
                                               
January 7, 2015, in which the headquarters of a controversial French magazine were 
attacked by two Islamist shooters). 
 210. Angelique Chrisafis, France Passes New Surveillance Law in Wake of Charlie Hebdo 
Attack, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/may/05/france-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack 
(describing how the legislation “will allow authorities to spy on the digital and mobile 
phone communications of anyone linked to a ‘terrorist’ inquiry without prior 
authorisation”); see Nathan Sales, French Surveillance Law Compared to US Surveillance, 
JUST SECURITY (July 31, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25143/snapshot-
french-surveillance-law-compared-surveillance-law (stating that the legislation gives 
the French government “sweeping new powers,” including the authority to wiretap 
without a warrant); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Beyond the Paris Attacks:  Unveiling the War 
Within French Counterterror Policy, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1313–14 (2016) (commenting 
on the disproportionate impact of the “French Patriot Act” on Muslim populations). 
 211. Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 737–38. 
 212. INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., NO TRADE OFF:  HOW THE FREE FLOW OF DATA 
ENHANCES TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2016) (describing how regulations restricting 
market access to data companies in some African countries have made it difficult for 
these companies to obtain licenses, thus “limiting the number of service providers and 
creating a de facto monopoly”). 
 213. See Daskal, supra note 186 (commenting that “customers may increasingly flee from 
U.S. providers in an effort to shield their data from the U.S. government’s reach”). 
 214. See Jennifer Baker, EU Commission Aims to Ban Forced Data Localization, IAPP 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-commission-aims-to-ban-forced-data-
localization (noting that EU Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip has declared 
that “trust is everything” in regulating data privacy); see also WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 
RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA:  TRUST AND CONTEXT IN USER-CENTRED DATA ECOSYSTEMS 
3 (2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_Trustand 
Context_Report_2014.pdf (describing how companies are losing individuals’ trust 
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ensuring proper privacy and security measures can be pushed out of a 
market.215  By allowing users to choose between rival providers, the 
market hypothetically incentivizes providers to employ better privacy 
protocols.  However, in order for this market to exist, data must be able 
to move across borders.216  The implementation of data localization 
regulations will likely result in companies exiting or foregoing 
entrance into markets.217  Thus, choices for users will be limited, and 
they will be unable to change providers if they are uncomfortable or 
disagree with certain privacy controls.218  If the number of corporations 
within a territory is limited, the user must either not use the technology 
or acquiesce to the privacy controls used by the company.219  This 
distinction may be insignificant if the corporation employs adequate 
protections, but substantial if the corporation provides backdoor 
access to the local government.220 
                                               
regarding data protection and how they must adapt their practices to respect their 
customers’ privacy expectations in order to survive). 
 215. See Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May Deter Economic 
and Other Online Activities, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-internet-privacy-and-security-may-
deter-economic-and-other-online-activities (discussing the impact of decreased user 
trust on corporations and finding that forty-five percent of households surveyed about 
their online activity reported refraining from conducting financial transactions online 
due to a lack of trust in internet privacy). 
 216. Baker, supra note 214. 
 217. See JAMES M. KAPLAN & KAYVAUN ROWSHANKISH, GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE, ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DATA LOCATION REGULATION IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 2 (2015) (commenting on inefficiency costs of localization causing financial 
corporations to leave markets); Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 682 (stating that data 
localization will increase costs for information service providers in such a manner that 
will render “many of such global services impossible”); Natasha Lomas, Twitter Is 
Reviewing Whether to Store Some User Data in Russia, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/19/twitter-is-reviewing-whether-to-store-some-
user-data-in-russia (commenting on how LinkedIn has been blocked in Russia for 
refusal to comply with data localization regulations). 
 218. See Chander & Lê, supra note 3, at 720 (explaining Microsoft’s argument that 
localizing data could limit customer choice, saying that customers “should have the 
ability to personally control their [data and records] by choosing to have their [data] 
held by an entity” outside the country). 
 219. See id. at 716–17 (arguing that because of localization, local companies may 
choose or be required to utilize companies with weak security measures that have less 
need to offer stronger security measures to attract customers). 
 220. Backdoor access allows a government direct access via a purposeful security 
flaw to user content and information regardless of whether encryption is in place.  See 
Issue Brief:  A “Backdoor” to Encryption for Government Surveillance, CDT (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-
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C.  Security Impact 
Today, companies employ a series of technical and non-technical 
controls to identify threats, defend against attacks, and respond to 
network intrusions.221  Basic technical controls generally include 
deploying firewalls and intrusion detection systems and monitoring to 
identify unauthorized access or data exfiltration.222  Non-technical 
controls consist of policies and procedures, such as employment of 
least privilege,223 development of an incident response plan, and 
adherence to a patch management policy.224  A well-structured 
information security program will leverage both technical and non-
technical controls to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information to protect data from bad actors, prevent 
intentional change, and ensure access.225 
                                               
surveillance.  Such access allows governments to conduct warrantless and 
indiscriminate surveillance.  Id. 
 221. These concepts are integrated into various U.S. and international 
cybersecurity frameworks, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework) and the International Standards 
Organization 27001 (ISO 27001) standards. 
 222. “Firewalls have been a first line of defense in network security for over [twenty-
five] years” and are a type of “network security device that monitors incoming and 
outgoing network traffic.”  What Is a Firewall, CISCO, https://www.cisco.com/ 
c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/what-is-a-firewall.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  
Intrusion detection systems are another type of network security technology that 
detects “vulnerability exploits against a target application or computer.”  What Is an 
Intrusion Detection System?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/ 
cyberpedia/what-is-an-intrusion-detection-system-ids (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 223. The principle of least privilege is the idea that a user is only granted the 
amount of access to a system that is required for that user to complete his or her job.  
Jerome H. Saltzer & Michael D. Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer 
Systems, Univ. VA, CS551:  Security and Privacy on the Internet Fall 2000 (1974), 
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs551/saltzer. 
 224. IT managers use patch management systems to quickly fix emerging 
vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications.  DANIEL VOLDAL, SANS INST., A 
PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING A PATCH MANAGEMENT PROCESS 1 (2003), 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/practical-methodology-
implementing-patch-management-process-1206 (explaining the importance of patch 
management and its role in systems configurations). 
 225. See OFFICIAL (ISC)2 GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 7 (Adam Gordan ed., 4th ed., 2015). 
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Localization will require new servers, people,226 and tools in each 
jurisdiction in which the company operates or has users.227  This 
replication of systems will create fragmented networks linked to territorial 
boundaries within an enterprise.228  By simply stretching and segmenting 
the enterprise network, data localization reduces the efficacy of security 
practices and tools to detect and respond to cybersecurity threats.229  
Instead, by centralizing data in several key data centers throughout the 
world, corporations can implement defense-in-depth practices and 
reduce redundancies.230  By doing so, corporations are able to ensure 
uniform management of the systems, scale prediction and detection 
technologies to secure a higher quantity of user data, and leverage the 
distributed architecture of the internet to ensure data availability.231 
                                               
 226. See LEVIATHAN SEC. GRP., ANALYSIS OF CLOUD VS. LOCAL STORAGE:  CAPABILITIES, 
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES 2 (2015) (outlining the difficulties in cybersecurity hiring 
domestically and internationally). 
 227. See ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GRP., DATA LOCALIZATION:  A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL 
COMMERCE AND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 7 (2015) (commenting on the 
lackluster realized employment gains associated with data center constructions); Paul 
Mozur et al., Apple Opening Data Center in China to Comply with Cybersecurity Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/apple-china-data-
center-cybersecurity.html (discussing the costs of Apple’s data center in China). 
 228. See WILLIAM J. DRAKE ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, INTERNET FRAGMENTATION:  
AN OVERVIEW 45 (2016) (commenting that data localization results in fragmentation 
at the content, routing, and transactional levels). 
 229. See John Lenhart, Security for the 21st Century Economy:  Borders Hold Less 
Meaning—and That’s a Good Thing, INFO. TECH. INDUSTRY COUNCIL (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://www.itic.org/news-events/techwonk-blog/security-for-the-21st-century-
economy-borders-hold-less-meaning-and-thats-a-good-thing (commenting that 
localization deprives corporations of comprehensive real time monitoring and limits 
deployment of preventative defenses and security controls). 
 230. Defense in depth is the concept “that a layered approach to network security 
makes for a formidable challenge for attackers.”  SCOTT RASMUSSEN, SANS INST., 
CENTRALIZED NETWORK SECURITY MANAGEMENT:  COMBINING DEFENSE IN DEPTH WITH 
MANAGEABLE SECURITY 2 (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ 
bestprac/centralized-network-security-management-combining-defense-in-depth-
manageable-security-659 (describing comprehensive cybersecurity as one that plugs 
diverse methods and technologies into the broadest sampling of the network). 
 231. See id. (describing how the defense in depth approach makes it much more 
difficult for attackers to compromise a network, while “network security personnel are 
faced with the same requirement to maintain currency on the diverse architecture as 
well as vigilance”). 
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This replication of systems is not only expensive to build but also 
difficult to manage because it creates non-uniform security practices.232  
By decentralizing the governance and response, data localization 
essentially creates a federated system within the larger enterprise, 
entrusting each country with autonomy over its own systems.233  As a 
result, each jurisdiction is able to choose which types of hardware to 
use, how to classify incidents, and how to administer privileges.234 
To better illustrate this, consider hypothetical company A, a multi-
national company with customers in the United States, European 
Union, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, and Malaysia.  Before localization, 
company A has data centers in the United States, Ireland, and India, 
and it manages all user data from these data centers.  In 2020, Mexico, 
Malaysia, and Singapore all pass data localization laws, mandating that 
all citizen user data be hosted on servers within the relevant territorial 
jurisdiction.  Prior to localization, company A only needed three sets 
of servers, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and security staff to 
manage cybersecurity risks worldwide.  In a post-localization world, 
company A must maintain six sets of these technical and non-technical 
controls, with one in each jurisdiction. 
By inserting more humans and machines into the enterprise’s 
network, localization not only increases the surface area for attacks, 
but also allows for new zero-day exploits235 and alters how each group 
will detect and respond to attacks.236  The difference in response can 
then be the difference between threat mitigation and breach, with the 
                                               
 232. See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, GUIDE TO CLOUD COMPUTING FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 5 (2011) (commenting that “uniform security management practices” 
enable key security practices). 
 233. See Allen C. Johnston & Merrill Warkentin, IT Security Governance and Centralized 
Security Controls, in ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS ASSURANCE AND SYSTEM SECURITY:  
MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 24 (Merrill Warkentin & Rayford Vaughn eds., 
2006) (stating that an end-user’s failure to follow through on security protocols in a 
decentralized system can potentially compromise the entirety of the network). 
 234. See Rosslin J. Robles et al., Information Security Control Centralization and IT 
Governance for Enterprises, INT’L J. MULTIMEDIA & UBIQUITOUS ENGINEERING, July 2008, at 
67, 73 (indicating that in a decentralized system there is “a high level of autonomy for 
end users in dealing with the security of their respective computing resources”). 
 235. A zero-day exploit is “an unknown exploit . . . that exposes a vulnerability in 
software or hardware and can create complicated problems well before anyone realizes 
something is wrong.”  What Is a Zero-Day Exploit?, FIREEYE, https://www.fireeye.com/ 
current-threats/what-is-a-zero-day-exploit.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 236. See Johnston & Warkentin, supra note 233, at 21 (commenting that a lack of 
“motivation or efficacy for compliance with . . . policies and procedures” can have 
devastating effects in a decentralized system). 
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latter resulting in the exposure of personal records, unwanted public 
attention, and regulatory scrutiny. 
Additionally, a centralized security system enables a company to 
more effectively leverage prediction and detection technologies.237  A 
centralized information technology system allows for a company to 
have broader insights into its environment, and it also enables the 
company to aggregate information from across the network to 
determine trends and identify abuse.238  By employing a “big data” 
solution to IT security, a corporation can detect incidents more quickly 
and reduce the time between intrusion and detection.239 
Finally, data localization limits the ability of companies to ensure 
system and data availability by leveraging the distributed infrastructure 
of the internet.240  Because data can be split, copied, and moved, 
companies are able to leverage the internet’s infrastructure to distribute 
data to servers in different states, nations, or regions.241  Companies are 
able to increase both the efficiency of distribution and security 
surrounding the information by sharding the data,242 load balancing it 
                                               
 237. See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 232, at 16 (commenting that 
“[c]loud computing creates the ability to link together millions of security nodes” to 
better detect threats). 
 238. RASMUSSEN, supra note 230, at 9. 
 239. Dwell time is the time from the initial intrusion (e.g., patient zero clicks on a 
phishing link) to the time that the intrusion is detected and removed from the system.  
ERIC COLE, SANS INST., DETECT, CONTAIN, AND CONTROL CYBERTHREATS 1 (2015), 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/detect-control-
cyberthreats-36187; see, e.g., MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2017:  A VIEW FROM THE FRONT 
LINES 7 (2017) (reporting average dwell times of roughly one hundred days). 
 240. Richard Bennett, Surge in Data Localization Laws Spells Trouble for Internet Users, 
AEI (May 10, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/surge-in-data-localization-laws-
spells-trouble-for-internet-users. 
 241. See Reisman, supra note 199 (giving the example of an email service that makes 
a person’s email accessible anywhere in the world, stating that the messages “probably 
exist in multiple copies, which could be located in more than one country”). 
 242. Companies shard data by splitting files into many pieces and spreading the 
pieces across distributed systems.  While this process not only allows for quick recovery, 
it also means that “[n]o single datacenter has all the information required to 
reassemble a given document.”  Patrick S. Ryan et al., When the Cloud Goes Local:  The 
Global Problem with Data Localization, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, at 54, 56. 
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across servers,243 and backing it up in multiple areas.244  This enables 
companies to more effectively respond to certain threat vectors,245 such 
as distributed denial of service attacks, and also mitigate system outages 
from an attack.246  Data localization restricts this movement by 
mandating that a copy of the data remain within the jurisdiction itself.247  
Thus, any balancing or movement of data must occur within the one 
network, essentially reducing the strength of the network’s response. 
  CONCLUSION 
The jury is out on whether Mr. Schrems or Microsoft intended for 
data localization to occur as a result of their successes.  By bringing 
these cases, these privacy advocates have highlighted the fundamental 
differences in the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy and have put 
traditional mechanisms for cross-border data transfers at risk.  Thus, 
these cases encourage data localization by opening the door for 
increased legislation, prohibiting data transfers from the European 
Union, and restricting data movement for law enforcement requests.  
These limitations, whether for commercial or law enforcement 
                                               
 243. Load balancing allows companies to re-distribute information or traffic 
depending upon where information and traffic is concentrated.  Load balancing is 
important for ensuring the availability of data and the reliability of applications.  Load 
Balancer, F5 NETWORKS, INC., https://f5.com/glossary/load-balancer (last visited Feb. 
7, 2018); What Is Network Load Balancing?, MICROSOFT (Mar. 28, 2003), 
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc779570(v=ws.10).aspx; see LEVIATHAN 
SEC. GRP., supra note 226, at 3 (describing how geographic redundancy allows 
corporations to continue operating despite natural disasters or political disruptions); 
see also BROUGH DAVIS, SANS INST., LEVERAGING THE LOAD BALANCER TO FIGHT DDOS 13 
(2010), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/firewalls/leveraging-load-
balancer-fight-ddos-33408 (suggesting that global load balancing can be used to 
mitigate DDoS attacks). 
 244. Business Challenge:  Backup & Recovery, SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/ 
computer-backup (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 245. A threat, or attack, vector describes the manner in which a bad actor attempts 
to or is successful in compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a 
victim’s network.  Glossary of Security Terms, SANS INSTIT. (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) 
https://www.sans.org/security-resources/glossary-of-terms. 
 246. During a DDoS attack, an attacker attempts to take down a system or prevent 
legitimate users from accessing a site by flooding a network with information.  Security 
Tip (ST04-015):  Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY 
READINESS TEAM (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015. 
 247. Deven Desai, Beyond Location:  Data Security in the 21st Century, COMM. ACM, Jan. 
2013, at 34, 36 (commenting that “location-based rules falter in a large area such as 
the EU” and “fail in smaller markets” because the traffic spikes or DDoS attacks cannot 
be distributed to low traffic servers outside of the territorial jurisdiction). 
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purposes, undermine user privacy and enterprise data security by 
placing data under government control and fragmenting corporate 
information security practices. 
Before the courts affirm these cases, they should consider the true 
state of U.S. and EU law and consider the consequences of each case.  
Though all litigation has an effect on parties, precedents, and politics, 
not all consequences are created equally.  A key consequence of these 
cases is the fragmentation, which will restrict families, businesses, and 
leaders from connecting, profiting, and communicating over the 
internet.  While these consequences were likely unintended, these 
cases have created a territorial regulatory regime for data privacy—a 
regime that is antithetical to the free and secure flow of information.  
Ultimately, these cases will make user data worldwide more vulnerable 
to privacy and security violations by good and bad actors alike. 
